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Working to Recover the Essence of Education
for the Sake of Teaching and Teacher
Education: Towards a Phenomenological
Understanding of the Forgotten, Ontological
Aspects of Learning
JAMES MAGRINI
College of Dupage
Abstract: The current definition of a good teacher is grounded in sets of pre-determined competencies established and imposed
upon schools by bureaucratic organizations that are, proximally and for the most part, removed from the foundational elements of
education, namely, the existential, embodied conscious experience of teaching and learning as it unfolds in the lived world of
schools and universities. As Pinar (2004) observes, contemporary American education is deterministic, and “in its press for
efficiency and standardization,” has the effect of reducing “teachers to automata” (p. 28). Thus, the subject-hood, or authentic
identity, of both teachers and students is not of their own free construction, both run the risk of becoming mechanized and
depersonalized because education has lost sight of, or obscured, what it means to be human in the first instance, which is an
autonomous Being-in-the-world with others. Teachers are increasingly becoming alienated from the curriculum (educational
content and pedagogy), their students, and themselves with dire consequences to the overall view to authentic subject-hood and real
education.
In this essay, I focus on diverse and alternative forms of meaning arising from the lived, embodied
conscious experience of educators and students in the process of learning, in order to reacquaint
practitioners (those who teach and those who educate prospective teachers with the forgotten and more
original aspects of education. Through a phenomenological method (epoche and eidetic reduction), I attempt to
show how teacher alienation might be transcended through an understanding of real education, by means of
recovering the forgotten ontological aspects of learning and living, which might lead in a positive direction to
the reassessment of the standards, practices, and values of contemporary education. Admittedly, this form of
ontological insight into the grounds of real education as I define it is not measurable by means of a
standardized epistemological model, through quantifiable data. However, this originary form of insight into
the human and education holds the potential to enrich professional development and improve the quality of
our teaching and teacher education programs.1
1

Bonnett (1978) states that it is necessary for philosophers of education to embark on the “rather large undertaking of attempting an
ontology of man,” for education must reaffirm the notions as “self-expression, conscious choice and appropriation of thoughts,
human understanding,” all of which involve basic and “fundamental assumptions” about the human being (p. 55). Bonnett adds that
it would be “strange” indeed if such basic assertions about the ontological “nature and development of the human did not have
implications for education,” in that they hold the potential to inspire a “shift in emphasis in which education is regarded as a process
in which the expression and the development of the individual through the acquisition of authentic understanding is central” (Ibid. p.
60). If the process admits of a formal institutionalization, i.e., if phenomenological “description” is to serve as a theory for
“prescriptive” educational practice, it might give rise to “the practical maxim that the child is to do nothing that he cannot himself
see the point or value of in the context of his own concerns” (Ibid. p. 60). This is not to indicate that educators are not actively
exposing the child, by means of enlarging the student’s understanding, to a variety of “things beyond his present understanding,” to
which educators have agreed are valuable, for this is required for education, “provided only that it is conducted in the context of the
pupil’s own care” (Ibid. p. 61).
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1. Alienation in Education: The Loss of Authentic Being-in-the-World
A. The Crisis in Contemporary Education
There is a crisis in contemporary democratic education: radical achievement gaps in the public schools, a
shortage of highly trained and effective teachers, and the continued bureaucratization of the American
university where market place values dominate (Pinar, 2004; Spring, 2000; Solomon & Solomon, 1994).
While a detailed, systematic diagnosis of this problem is beyond the scope of this essay, I consider two
problems inhibiting the drive toward effective education. First, the ineffectiveness of teacher reform
emerging from the professionalization agenda for the training of effective teachers, which attempts to definitively
establish what teachers should know and teach, and secondly, the detrimental effects of “high stakes” testing
on students and their teachers, who upon entering a system of education are forced to teach an inauthentic
curriculum. Reading Diamond (2008) and Zeichner (2009), it is possible to trace these problems to the social
efficiency model in education, which represents the dominating ideological force in American education. Thus, a
brief explication of its philosophy and educational methodology is provided in order to contrast this
stultifying view of education with an alternative, more positive vision of authentic education.
Spring (2000) writes that the “dominant public goals for education in the twentieth century are
economic […] and these goals include preparation for work, the control of labor, and economic
development” (p. 5). In 1990, as a result of Bush’s education initiative (State of the Union), schools were
focused heavily on math and science, which represented a “political decision based on economic concerns”
(p. 4). Diamond (2007), researching the effects of “high stakes testing” on curricula, identifies a shift in the
trend favoring math and science, and writes that as of recently standardized education has seen a rise of math
and language arts in the curriculum; despite the change in curricular focus, what is being taught is still
determined in great part by goals and aims linked to standardized tests. Pinar (2004) argues that despite “the
empty rhetoric linking education with democracy and politically involved citizenry,” schools continue to exist
for the explicit purpose of job preparation in an age of radical technological advancement (p. 235).
Education has not evolved in the past 100 years, it has simply gone from “preparing citizens for jobs in an
industrial economy” to preparing citizens for jobs in a corporate economy,” and so the “base economic
function of schools remain unchanged” (Ibid. p. 234). It appears that our educational, pedagogical, and
ultimately, our overarching curricular goals are still grounded in the essential principles of utility and the
student’s potential contribution, as functioning and flourishing democratic citizen, to the general economic
growth of the country.
The social efficiency model works off product-process logic for designing and implementing curriculum (as
in the Tyler rational), it is teleological, i.e., goals, standards, and objectives, which comprise the definition of
“good education” are determined in advance, and often times, at a proximal distance from the practical
unfolding of learning in the classroom. For example, private foundations (Carnegie Corporation) and
accrediting agencies (ETS – Education Testing Service) are “non-governmental professional organizations
that establish standards and criteria for educational institutions” (Spring, 2000, p. 207). Since the social efficiency
model works to implement programmed instruction, which is designed to assure that students achieve
established sets of standardized objectives, it deals only “with a limited part of the child’s total functioning; it
is not intended to give students a well-rounded education but to provide them with a set of specialized skills”
(Schiro, 2009, p. 85). Kliebard (1984) has labeled the social efficiency model the least academic of the four
educational ideologies, and in fact, has referred to it as “the most anti-academic” (p. 33). According to Pinar
(1994) this model for education, which embodies the “factory model” in praxis, has turned the classroom
into a highly unpleasant and unproductive environment for teachers and students, causing more than a few
teachers to
retreat into the apparent safety of their own subjectivities. But in doing so, they have abdicated their
professional authority and ethical responsibility for the curriculum they teach. They have been forced to
abdicate this authority by the bureaucratic protocols that presumably hold them “accountable,” but which in
fact, render them unable to teach (p. 4).
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B. The Professionalization Agenda, High Stakes Testing, and Teacher Alienation
Zeichner (2003), writing on recruiting, preparing, and retaining qualified teachers, addresses deficiencies
associated with the professionalization agenda, which as stated, represents the “current incarnation of what has
been referred to as the social efficiency tradition of reform in teacher education – the quest to establish a
profession of teaching through the articulation of a knowledge base for teachers based on educational
research and professional judgment” (P. 498). This agenda is propelled by the National Board for
Professional Teaching Standards, the National Commission on Teacher’s and America’s Future (NCTAF),
the National Council of American Teacher Education (NCATE), and the Holmes Group and Partnership.
The professionalization agenda pushes for universal standards that determine teacher excellent, and as a system,
“addresses teachers’ abilities to display certain knowledge, dispositions, and perfections thought to be
necessary for effective teaching” (Ibid. p. 498). Because the federal government, private foundations, and
accrediting agencies are playing major roles in “nationalizing educational policies,” a yawning chasm exists
between those who draft and push for the implementation of education standards, many of whom are not
remotely involved with education, and the actual lived sphere of the curriculum (Spring, 2001, p. 201).
The professionalization agenda is not concerned with much of the empirical research available that
establishes specific links between standards and student learning, and because the validity of the standards is
based on the decisions of panels of experts and scholars, there is a “failure to establish clear links in teacher
standards and pupil learning even as broadly defined,” and as a result, critics argue that “performance based
teacher education is of little consequence” (Zeichner, 2003, pp. 498-299). As related to the issue of alienation
in education, Zeichner raises an important point regarding the fact that experienced teachers are becoming
more and more hesitant to work in teacher education programs because “they are asked to write
performance indicators and rubrics and to examine their courses to see if they are covering what will be
covered on the state content exams” (p. 501). Along with public education, teacher education programs are
also grounded in the product-process model of education, and are thus creating the identical problem in higher
education that exists on the levels of elementary and secondary education, which Apple (2004) describes as a
situation wherein the “tail of the test wags the dog of the teacher” (p. 174). Educators in institutions of
higher learning are unable to freely select and organize curriculum content and pedagogy, which might
benefit from their insight, experience, and sense of better judgment concerning the best ways to educate
teachers because they have been absolved of the responsibility of writing and implementing the curriculum.
As Zeichner states, this type of standard based educational program for teachers does not lead to better
learning, and that the clear and present danger is already upon us, because teacher education is

turning performance based teacher education into a purely mechanical implementation activity that has lost
sight of any real purpose and of the need to constantly step back from the daily grind of implementation to ask
hard questions about what is being accomplished and for whose benefit (p. 502)

Diamond (2008) stresses yet another aspect of educator and student alienation from the curriculum,
namely, the manner in which “high stakes testing” is negatively effecting both curriculum content and
pedagogical methods. Diamond states that teacher and student accountability and performance on
standardized tests has changed the face of education, e.g., Illinois State Standards directly effect
“instructional content (the knowledge and skills that teachers teach) and pedagogy (how teachers teach that
content)” (p. 293). Since the bulk of the curriculum is grounded in the content of standardized tests, based
on the Board of Education’s mandates, the context of the learning environment, and subsequently those who
teach and learn, is being adversely affected in the following ways: First, there is a narrow focus of curriculum
content, e.g., Diamond sights a current rise in privileging math and language arts over other subjects such as
science and social studies. Next, there is a narrow focus within these areas that are privileged, e.g., only
certain aspects of math and language arts are highlighted. Finally, there is a significant amount of class time
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devoted to test preparation, e.g., teachers are not only drilling students using the content of tests, they are
also reproducing the stultifying “testing atmosphere” in the classroom. 2
It is evident that there is a serious problem with educational procedures emerging out of the
“bureaucratic/rational choice model” that is two-fold in nature, a problem that is in fact antibiotic, as in a
vicious sense of codependence. Instructors who are increasingly alienated from what might serve as
legitimate, or authentic, curriculum for the preparation of teachers entering the field are slaves to institutions
governed by pre-determined standards of achievement. These institutions are then filtering ill-prepared
(alienated) teachers into a system that is governed in much the same way, namely, by standards and
competencies established by bureaucratic agencies that are at a remove from authentic educational purposes
and practices. Teachers are thus alienated in a duplicitous sense, both from the curriculum they are now
forced to teach and the students who cannot relate to what is being taught. Bonnett (2001) echoes the
sentiments expressed earlier when stating that the current “predisposition to regard outcomes of education as
definable in advance of the process of education” engenders a deterministic system of education that obscures
authentic subject-hood and we lose sight of the fact that humans are “individual centers of consciousness
capable of relating to the world in ways that have personal meaning, for this is essential to human being
against some sort of mechanized and depersonalized being” (p. 30). In short, there is a loss of ownership on
the part of both educator and student, but beyond this, there is a loss of authentic subject-hood; ironically, by
means of education, we are losing sight of what it means to be truly human.
The alienation from the curriculum and authentic subject-hood of which I speak should not be
conceived in terms of Marxist theory, which tends to focus on ideology and the critique of capitalism and its
detrimental effects on schools. Rather, I conceive alienation and depersonalization in terms of what
Heidegger (1979) calls the oblivion, or forgetting, of Being, which is grounded in the failure to ask about “the
truth of being itself” and about “the way the essence of human being belongs to the truth of Being” (p. 246).
This condition, which pervades the world of education, grows from the tradition in Western metaphysics and
its subsequent influence on the rise of science and technology. In short, education is moving us farther away
from essential issues of human dwelling as linked with our Being, and the ontological aspects of our
existence. It is now to the potential recovery of this essential, forgotten ontological notion of authentic Beingin-the-world as related to education that I turn.

2. The Phenomenological Understanding of Real Education and Authentic Being-in-theWorld
A. Real Education Conceived as Plato’s Paideia
Transcending the alienated, inauthentic state of education, concerned with the issue of what teachers should
know and learn, begins with an authentic understanding of education, which includes a reinterpretation and
reassessment of the ‘traditional’ teacher-student relationship as expressed within social efficiency ideology. This
calls for the crucial understanding that students are not in the first instance “information processors,” rather
they are “seekers of meaning,” and education is never reducible to a cold, calculative process of digesting and
accumulating information, but rather resembles an act of love, as eros, such as we find in the “very best
ancient Platonic model,” where education represents the “instruction and inspiration of souls” (Solomon &
Solomon, 1994, p. 20). Heidegger expresses the notion of Plato’s authentic education, which is elucidated
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Although Diamond’s findings show that the effect of high stakes testing has a greater effect on curriculum content than pedagogy,
Pike (2003) writing on the authentic aspects of teaching English, or literature, indicates that a major change in pedagogy is evident
when educators are forced to approach literature exclusively from the perspective of the Either/Or epistemological framework. Pike
observes that English teaching is being reduced to a calculative and “explicit” endeavor, wherein teaching is akin to a technology, or
“vehicle which delivers a subject in an efficient and effective manner, where rote analysis and explicit teaching are all that appear to
be required” (p. 92). In effect, English teaching, which should unfold as interpretation, along the lines of hermeneutic discourse, is
being reduced to a didactic system of delivery, and so in reading Pike there is the sense that pedagogy (at least as it relates to teaching
literature, which interesting enough, Diamond claims is now being privileged in the “High Stakes” curriculum) is in fact impacted in a
severely detrimental way.
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through etymology focused on the ancient notion of what a “real,” or authentic, education is in terms of
paideia.
Heidegger (1996), rendering the Greek from the Republic, claims that Plato’s “real” education takes
hold of the “soul (psyche) itself and transforms it in its entirety by first of all leading us back to the place of
our essential Being and accustoming us to it” (p. 167). It is the antithesis of the rote transformation of
information as found in much of contemporary education grounded social efficiency ideology, which as
Thompson (2003) argues, resembles the “filling up of the psyche with knowledge as if inscribing a tabla rasa or,
in more contemporary parlance, ‘training up’ the neural web” (p. 134). To grasp the originary meaning of
paideia as employed by Plato, Heidegger (1996) points out the multifarious ways in which the term means,
and states that it represents the movement or process from an uneducated state (apaideusia) to a state of
education (paideia). While this seems an obvious, if not banal, description of the process of education,
Heidegger highlights the depth and complexity this vision of education holds by comparing Plato’s use of
paideia to the essential German rendering of Bildung, which for Heidegger
means forming [Bilden] in the sense of impressing a character that unfolds. But at the same time this “forming”
[Bilden] “forms” [bildet] or impresses a character by antecedently taking its measure from some measure given
vision, which for that reason is called pre-conception [Vor-bild] (p. 166).

Against the product-process model, Heidegger argues that authentic education demands of the educator
a fore-knowing, an insight into the unfolding of essential learning, but rather than simply the understanding of
how students learn, through observing and charting the stages of their cognitive development, the form of
insight Heidegger is concerned with is an ontological insight that penetrates into the student’s Being. In
many ways it is, and must be, an incomplete vision, for it is not like the vision of the artisan-craftsman
(technite), who by means of knowledge (techne) captures an accurate, indelible vision of the essence of the ergon,
as finished product, artifact, or object in advance of efficaciously bringing it into existence. Heidegger states
that the “turning” in the processes of Plato’s education “has to do with one’s Being and this takes place in
the very grounds of one’s essence” (P. 166). Thus, the vision of the educator is always informed by the
human’s ontological constitution, and this insight serves to engender the evolution of a “real” education,”
which requires knowledge of “the true relation between teachers and taught” (Heidegger, 1959, pp. 15-16).
For both Plato and his mentor Socrates, the notion of soul, or psyche, represents the moral locus of
the human, and beyond, the center of one’s Being, or essence as ‘identity’. It is clear that when Socrates
engages an interlocutor through the method of dialectic in quest of defining the virtues, he is
communicating, and beyond, communing with the essence of that person. For example, when conversing
with Alcibiades, Socrates states the following: “I, Socrates, am not arguing or talking with the face of
Alcibiades, but with the real Alcibiades; and that is with his soul” (Plato, 1999, p. 456). In contemporary
discussions of philosophy and education, we find a similar notion of this ancient Greek ideal of “selfidentity” expressed in terms of phenomenological self-hood. This notion of the self, as will be elaborated, which
forms the foundation for authentic education as teacher-pupil interaction, represents the ontological view of
the human being, or its being-human, that educators and those who oversee education have fallen away from
with to the severe detriment of both educators and students.

B. Toward a Phenomenological Understanding of the Human Being
Bonnett (2009), also grapples with the detrimental effects of education’s “rigid and limited conceptions of
what it is to be ‘more fully human’ through pre-specified aims and objectives of the sort found in many
‘rationally justified’ curricula,” and warns of the trend in education to dehumanize both teachers and students
(p. 360). Education has objectified the sense of authentic self-hood, reducing it to the hypostatized
construction of forces that are external to and beyond the control of the individual. As previously stated, this
gives rise to the deterministic view of the human, one who has been stripped of her autonomy, her authentic
freedom. In such a state the self becomes both “decentered in the sense of losing its central epistemic
position and denucleated in the sense that any supposed core or essence is removed” (Ibid. p. 360). This
post-modern notion of the self, according to Bonnett, is both “phenomenologically untenable and
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educationally stultifying” (Ibid. 357). Moving beyond Bonnett, I suggest that that the understanding of the
human being as Being-in-the-world with others should precede discourse on the determination of the
overarching purposes, aims, and goals of education, and so I move to formalize a reconceived notion of
phenomenological self hood as it relates to inspiring a view towards authentic education as it emerges from two
philosophical sources: (1) Sartre’s3 phenomenological description of Being-for-itself and the notion of freedom
and the concomitant burden of responsibility, which opens the potential for our authentic projects and
allows for the manifestation of the unique values we bring into existence through autonomous choice, and
(2) Heidegger’s phenomenological (fundamental) ontology of Dasein (“there-being”) and the ontological
understanding of Dasein’s “care-structure,” which grounds the deep, solicitous care we demonstrate for our
Being and the Being of others.
Attempting to return to the grounds of human existence in order to philosophically define the
human in terms of its untapped ontological-existential possibilities, I consider the invariant structures of pure
intentional experience, which ground and define our embodied conscious worldly existence, as the essence of
our Being-in-the-world with others. A brief description of the phenomenological method employed to reveal
these transcendent-embodied structures will enhance the reader’s awareness of this philosophical process to
uncover the original grounds of our humanity. Since both Sartre and Heidegger are indebted to Husserl’s
“phenomenological method,” a rudimentary overview of the process will assist the reader, with the
understanding that first, this is only a brief description of a highly complex and technical method, and
second, the understanding that each thinker modified the phenomenological method (epoche-eidetic reduction)
for their own unique philosophical purpose.
Generally, the method unfolds through two phases: the phenomenological epoche (“bracketing”) and the
eidetic reduction. The first phase refers to the philosopher’s suspension judgment with respect to the
phenomenon under investigation, this allows for a whole range of unique and previously overlooked
dimensions of experience to manifest. In slightly more technical terms, the epoche allows us to see things
through a reconfigured lens where epistemological and psychological categories are held in abeyance, they
fall away and things appear non-contingent and independent of our subjective categorizations for defining
and understanding them. The second phase reveals insight into the essential and invariant structures
(ontological-existential) that give form to our existence, we see, as it were, in the particular manifestation of
the phenomenon what is essential to all phenomenon of that type, i.e., when aspects of the contingent and
empirical withdraw, the eide are adumbrated and highlighted, they stand out in bold relief, and are made
available for thematic inquiry. For example, when “bracketing” the lived experience of education, we glean
insight into what is essential to all activities bound up with the processes of teaching and learning, without
which the empirical experience of education (teaching and learning) would be impossible.

C. The Phenomenological Ontology of Sartre’s Being-for-itself and Heidegger’s Dasein as Care
Sartre (1986) states that the main tenet of existentialism is reducible to the epigram, “existence precedes and
commands essence,” which succinctly represents the ontological understanding of the human being set
within a critique of essentialism in Western philosophy (p. 438). Any analysis of Sartre must begin and end
with the interrelated notions of freedom, responsibility, and the “creation” of values. The human is for Sartre
Being-for-itself (entre-pour-soi), while all other aspects of the world are Being-in-itself (entre-ea-soi). The human is free
and for-itself because she is self-questioning and can envision a life-project, or “fundamental project,” that
emerges through the exercise of her autonomy in relation to facticity within what Sartre terms “the situation”.
There is always the potential, barring the single fatality of death, of assessing, reassessing, and re-defining our
lives, this because of the ontological structure of freedom itself, which is a necessary condition for the
enactment of our freedom in any and all situations, within the lived experience of our life. Morris (2005)
3

I acknowledge the contribution of such scholars as Papastephanou (2009) for bringing Sartre into educational studies in philosophy.
She rightly comments that Sartre’s philosophy is relevant for educational studies “regardless of what Sartre really thought of
education or of whether contemporary philosophers have Sartre in mind when they share (or even radicalize) his suspicion of
everydayness, institutions, and practices” (p. 454). Sartre, unlike Heidegger, did not write explicitly on the state of education nor did
he offer a formalized philosophy of education; for this reason, it is far more common to encounter scholars engaging Heidegger in
their discussions of education than Sartre.
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states that being free within particular situations refers to “the fact that the situation is a condition for,
though not a limitation on, our freedom” (p. 144).
“To be free,” writes Sartre (1986), “is not to choose the historical world in which one arises – which
would have no meaning – but to choose oneself in the world whatever this might be” (p. 668). When born
into the world, or thrown-into-the-world, the historical milieu we enter is not of our choosing, it is literally given
to us in advance as heritage. This is something we cannot change, but can work with, in that we can
determine its meaning for us and re-value it if we so choose. Other aspects of facticity would include the laws
of nature, the historical world with its scientific limits, the genetic limits of our physiology, and the past
choices we have made as having-been. Sartre even includes family and community to this notion of facticity.
However, facticity, “far from being a danger to freedom, resolves only in enabling it to arise as freedom” (p.
Ibid. 621). Facticity might be understood as marking out the horizons, or limits, that allows for authentic
freedom to manifest in the first instance. Initially, our choices are made possible there is a convergence of
freedom (as human transcendence) and facticity.
Sartre (1986) writes of the freedom toward the enactment of a “fundamental project,” which always
involves “nothingness,” or the negatite, because in the present situation we are always seeking to bring into
existence that which has not-yet been chosen or given form, and all authentic action “necessarily implies as
its condition the recognition of a ‘desideratum,’ or lack, and absence” (Ibid. p. 560). Morris (2005) claims
that for Sartre, nothingness is duplicitous in nature, involving a “double nihilation”: First, the ideal end or goal
exists is conceived in futural terms as that which is not-yet enacted, and represents nothingness in the present
moment, while the present moment also shows up as lacking (nothingness) that particular “something” in
terms of the futural goal or ideal end (p. 148). As stated, freedom is directed toward our fundamental project,
which “constitutes the person’s – totally individual and changeable – essence” (Ibid. p. 154). We are utterly
responsible for our “fundamental project” and the enactment of our own unique possibilities that arise
through its creation, and this project is always bound up in important ways with others, because while
choosing a world the human is also choosing, or creating, the values that give meaning to it. The values that
the for-itself brings into existence also affect others, and so there is a great burden of responsibility associated
with the authentic exercise of one’s freedom.
If we turn from this responsibility, Sartre (1948) claims that we are living in bad faith, which in certain
instances amounts to turning ourselves and other human beings into objects, or the in-itself, things with
immutable essences lacking embodied, conscious potential. Thus, we must be cautious and clear when
making choices, for all actions are bound up with a process of personal valuation, but this valuing transcends
mere subjectivity when we are choosing projects that involve others, e.g., the creation of institutions, states,
nations, and the like: “And when we say that a man is responsible for himself, we do not only mean that he is
responsible for his own individuality, but that he is responsible for all men” (p. 471). Thus when we express
our values, we are at once informing the Other, “I value X, you too should value X.” So, we must always act
with the understanding that in significant ways we are ethically responsible for the Other’s Being. When
“creating” values, we are engaged in reassessing, reinterpreting, and either accepting or rejecting the values
that have, in many ways, been passed along to us through our emersion in the world and by way of our
heritage, which forms one of the horizons of our having-been. If we accept, or choose, these values as part of
the status quo, we are not exercising our freedom authentically, and hence, living in bad faith, resisting the
burden of freedom and making excuses for our imagined lack of autonomy. Since the latter portion of this
explication of Sartre concerned the human’s responsibility for others, I deepen this line of thought by
turning to the philosophy of Heidegger in order to further elucidate what human responsibility entails when
thinking about human communities, history, and destiny.
In Heidegger’s (1962) fundamental ontology, “care,” in terms of the human’s care-structure, is
instantiated within the “formal existential totality of Dasein’s ontological structural whole” (p. 237/192).4 Care
4

Having published articles on both Heidegger’s fundamental ontology of 1927 (Being and Time) and his later works of the so-called
“turn” (Kerhe), I acknowledge the division in educational studies between scholars favoring Being and Time and those who argue that
no authentic educational philosophy can emerge from the analysis of that text. However, there are Heidegger scholars such as Walter
Brogan who argue that Heidegger is successful in Being and Time at legitimizing the authentic move beyond radical individuation, and
thus accomplishing the task of establishing Dasein as communal Being-with-others through the temporal analysis of the notions of

8
situates the human being in the world temporally, as the stretching out of the Dasein from its birth to its
death, in such a way that both its own Being and the Being of others become issues for it. The understanding
of care is linked inextricably with the enactment of Dasein’s authentic Being-with others: “Selfhood is to be
discovered existentially only in Dasein’s authentic ability-to-be a self, that is to say, in the authenticity of
Dasein’s Being as care” (Ibid. p. 369/322). When dealing with others, our sense of concern should manifest as
care (Sorge) and in particular, care as Fursorge, or solicitude that “cares-for” the other, and this represents not
only a respect for and preservation of the other’s freedom, it also represents the call for a resolute
understanding of the responsibility we must shoulder when helping to the make the other’s freedom an
authentic possibility. When caring for entities in the world that are not like Dasein, we demonstrate concern
(Besorgen), e.g., when encountering present-at-hand entities. It would be inauthentic to show mere concern for
Dasein, and yet this is precisely what education grounded in the model for standardization appears to be
doing. Huebner (1999) expresses precisely this concern when critiquing educational goals, aims, and
objectives that are determined in advance of education, at a complete remove from the student’s temporality,
her historicity conceived in terms of the “caring” communal destining of Dasein’s supreme, authentic
manifestation of Being-with. Care, as Fursorge, is thus integral to Dasein’s living historically (Geschichtlichkeit) in
an authentic manner, crucial to it enacting its collective destiny (Geschick).
Heidegger (1962) states that Dasein’s authentic temporal existence, as related to the three moments,
or horizons, of the care-structure, expressed in terms of the fundamental character of our Being as “ahead-ofitself-Being-already-in (the world) as Being-alongside entities which we encounter (within-the-world),” is an
historical occurrence culminating in Dasein’s authentic destiny (p. 293/249). While it is certain that we die
alone, it is not the case that we enter the world in the self-same manner, for we are born into a family and
community, we share, as part of our throwness, a common lineage and heritage, and this element of our Being
discloses our factical possibilities through our authentic historical comportment, or historizing. When
authentic Dasein enacts its possibilities, projecting itself toward the future, its heritage approaches and is
taken up in “repetition,” by enacting the possibilities “it has inherited and yet chosen” (Ibid. p. 435/384).
However, the mere acknowledgement of the past does not constitute the authentic understanding of heritage
in terms of historicality, rather historicality involves choosing to accept or reject, through reinterpretation, the
decisions of its forebears, the collective ethos of the community, in light of its ownmost potential-for-Being.
Thus, there is a burden associated with the “repetition” of Dasein’s heritage. The concept of destiny, the
pinnacle of Dasein’s authentic existence, refers to the shared, collective historizing of a community, in which
people draw from a collective heritage and fatefully enact their existence through “communication” and
“struggle”. Destiny is not merely a collection of individual fates, as it is guided in advance by the fact that
Dasein’s existence is Being-in-the-world as Being-with. “Our fates have already been guided in advance, in our
Being with one another in the same world […] Only in communicating and struggling does the power of
destiny [Geschick] become free,” and our destiny is bound up with and in our “generation,” which makes up
our “authentic historizing” (Ibid. p. 436/384-385).

3. Reclaiming Our Authentic Being-in-the-World and Recovering of the Forgotten
Ontological Aspects of Education’s Essence
A. The Original Nature of the Question Concerning What Teachers Should Know and Learn: Grounding a
Curricular Vision
What are the implications of the ontological-existential insight as described above for educators in the lived
experience of the classroom of the public school, for educators in the lived world of the university who are
engaged in teacher education programs? I suggest the ontological concerns that are at stake manifest across
the curriculum through the organization, or bringing-into-existence, of the context of an authentic experience of
learning. My focus will not be directed on curriculum content, on the subjects that are included or excluded,
i.e., the knowledge-centered aspects of education. Rather, I am concerned with focusing on learner-centered
history, fate, and destiny. I leave it to the reader/practitioner to decide whether or not the inclusion of Heidegger from 1927
contributes in any beneficial way to their educational practices.
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and community-centered aspects of education along with the crucial aspects of authentic classroom
management when seeking to understand the types of things that authentic teachers should know and learn
and how they should approach the education of their students.
It is the case that when educators are developing a “curricular vision” they are concerned with the
knowledge of the students and how they learn, the content-knowledge that students are to be learning, and the
manner in which student learning might be clearly, cogently, and accurately assessed in relation to the goals
and aims of the curriculum in order to evaluate the processes of education (Darling-Hammond, et al, 2005).
However, I suggest that developing an authentic curricular vision does not begin with attempting to provide
answers to the foregoing curriculum concerns, but rather with an analysis of the questions being formulated
about education, which is to say, prior to concerning ourselves with answers or solutions to problems,
educators should return to an original understanding of the questions they are asking and encouraging
students to ask. For example, when formulating “original” questions, we embark on an inquiry as opposed to
an investigation. With respect to the latter, it is terminated by the answer provided; as related to the former, the
problem is not terminated but enriched by means of revelation and understanding (Gelvin, 1979, p. 81).
When asking original, or fundamental, questions, we learn that answers do not always follow the lines of
logical argumentation and that the truth revealed defies standards of deductive correctness. As related
specifically to our educational practices, Heidegger (2000) states that the original questions that educators
should be concerned with formulating emerge only when they are “not being seduced by overhasty theories,
but instead experiencing things as they are in whatever may be nearest” (p. 32/23). Original questions are of
a dual-nature: they are transformative in that they seek to reveal, but at the same time inspire in us the
preservation of and care for the basic question-worthy status of such things as love, existence, transcendence,
freedom, human potential, and authentic education. Original questioning “pushes us into the open […] and
transforms itself (as does every genuine questioning), and casts a new space over and through everything
(Ibid. p. 32/23).
Thus, the question I pose is of a special kind, which is antecedent to any formalized curriculum plan,
and it is not a question that admits of an easy answer, for it is the type of question that evokes the mode of
the infinitival as it attempts to elucidate the essential movement of the “lived experience” of learning,
intimately bound up with inquiry of a philosophical nature. Pursuant to the end of understanding what
authentic teachers should know and learn, as opposed to asking the question, “What is an effective teacher?”
Or, “What is an efficient curriculum?” I ask the more primordial question, “How is it in the first instance that
an authentic education unfolds in its essence?” Addressing this concern, the reader is encouraged, in a
resolute moment of reflexivity, to return to the lived world of the classroom as an ontological context for
learning in the originary sense, envisioning her future role as educator enlightened by the phenomenological
understanding of the ontological structures that ground our existence and the processes of real education.
This final section is devoted to inspiring the educator’s transcendence of the alienated state of education by
means of formulating a response to the foregoing query. The ontological-existential structures introduced
above will be reinterpreted in terms of their concrete enactment in educational praxis, through formalizing
the manner in which authentic education might be conceived, and from this interpretation, an authentic
curriculum is intimated through the vision emerging from the inquiry.

B. What Teachers Should Know and Learn About Freedom, Responsibility, and Values in the Classroom:
Structuring and Managing an Authentic Classroom
Classroom management includes the creation and sustaining of a fecund and intimate environment (or
world) for learning that engenders a sense of responsibility for the values that emerge through the activities
in which educators and students engage. The classroom environment that fosters and nurtures an
atmosphere of existential authenticity must be grounded in the notion of a free, responsible, and caring
human being, and this phenomenological understanding gleaned from approaching education by means of
asking fundamental questions about existence might serve as the guiding framework, or Gestell, marking or
sketching out the appropriate horizons within which the authentic occurrence of learning transpires.
Authentic classroom management should seek to allow students to feel-at-home-in-a-world of learning that is, in
great part, of their own making, in terms of their fundamental projects. It is possible to conceive of the
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curriculum in terms of a fundamental project, as the organizing structure that directs the learning, but is itself, as
of yet, incomplete, for it is “groundless,” bound up as it is with the students’ indeterminate futural potential.
It is possible to state that education, as our fundamental project, is rooted in the choices educators and students
make, it is always the “original choice which originally creates all reasons and all motives,” and our
fundamental project as educators “arranges the world and its meaning, its instrumental-complexities, and its
coefficient of adversity” (Sartre, 1986, p. 465).
Every for-the-sake-of-which, e.g., choice of curriculum, choice of content, choice of instruction and
assessment, selection of knowledge that we value or devalue, is directed toward the fulfillment of our
fundamental project. Thus, the phenomenological understanding of being human inspires the educator’s foreknowing into the authentic “formation” of the classroom because it is always already situated in the
ontological understanding of the student as human Being, as Being-for-Itself. Through this preparatory insight
into the Being of students, educators are readied to respond authentically to the ever-changing, ever-evolving
needs, wants, and desires of all students, which emerge through the understanding that change, becoming, and
transcendence are integral components of our lives, in terms of a way of life, and this is essential to all
authentic teaching and learning. All situations, all learners, hold the potential to be otherwise, but this is
something that is either forgotten or ignored in much of contemporary education, and such an authentic
understanding of the student as a locus of freedom and the unique, as of yet, untapped potential, as I
suggest, might be expressed in terms of Sartre’s philosophy.
Educators should be skeptical of such models for curriculum making as the Tyler (1949) rationale,
which through techniques of behavior modification leads students toward the achievement of curriculum
goals and aims that have been established in advance for their education. In addition, when we standardize,
label, and categorize students and prospective teachers preparing to enter the field based on rigid standards
that are pre-determined in advance of the curriculum, we are stripping students and educators of their
ontological essence, or existence as Being-for-itself and reducing them to mere objects, to Being-in-itself, to things
equivalent to the chairs, tables, desks, books, and things that fill up our classrooms that have immutable
essences but do not hold the power to transform their existence. There must be ways of teaching and
formulating the direction of our educational practices in which students are participants and co-creators in
the process of learning and the determination thereof in ways that maximize their freedom through the
enactment of unique possibilities that contribute simultaneously to the context of education, the formation
of the student, and the emergence of authentic standards of education, where the goals and aims for
teaching, rather than being determined in advance of the curriculum, are imminent as potential in the
authentic unfolding of the curriculum within the classroom.5 Greene (1995) also argues for the power of
student autonomy in contributing to the authentic “dialogue about educational purposes, standards and
common learning,” and claims that fundamental to the formation of our educational purposes must be “the
achievement of human freedom within a human community” (p. 184).6
Authentic classroom management is also concerned with the educator’s knowledge of the subject
matter, of pedagogy and the most effective ways to teach the subject-matter, and these issues are
undoubtedly important to effective teaching. However, putting these aforementioned components of
classroom management aside, our focus should first be on the understanding of “how” authentic education
5

Huebner (1999) writes of such a notion in his critique of the dominance of social efficiency in education, as represented in the Tyler
rationale when he states that definitive, pre-ordained goals and aims in education should not be the primary concern of curriculum
makers, for the “educators to easy acceptance of the function of or the necessity for purposes or objectives has replaced the need for
a basic awareness of his [temporality and] historicity” (p. 132).
6
Greene does not talk explicitly about the process of allowing goals and aims to organically emerge from the curriculum in progress,
but it is possible, in line with the phenomenological method, to imagine goals and aims for the curriculum emerging through a
process of hermeneutic interpretation. Following a “spiral structure,” rather than a linear model for curriculum-making, educators
begin with a fore-conception, or presupposition, concerning goals and outcomes, but these goals and outcomes are fluid and protean
in nature, they change, evolve, develop, and are reworked as knowledge and understanding of the student and her needs, desires, and
abilities are revealed and “interpreted” by the educator. Following a process-product model, goals and aims set forth at the outset are thus
subject to revision and elaboration as the educator works to deepen and clarify her understanding of that which emerges from the
learning experience. It must be noted that the goals and aims should always begin at the existential level of the ‘lived experience’ of
the student in her environment.
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unfolds by exploring the manner in which the educator approaches students, this despite the content of her
instruction. As opposed to didactic techniques such as monologue, where the educator embodies a
“possessor” of objective, immutable knowledge to be transferred through a system of “delivery” to students
who are empty vessels, education should unfold primarily by means of discourse (dialogue), which represents
the search for meaning through a process of inquiry and knowledge-construction, or meaning making, in
fellowship. This opens the space for student participation in a communal environment for learning, for in the
processes of asking original questions about not only the material they are engaging, but also their lives,
regarding various and potential meanings, students are at once assuming the role of learner, teacher, and
assessor, contributing to determining both the validity and value of the learning, in the context of the lesson.
As evident from Sartre’s philosophy as outlined, bound up with freedom is the supreme burden of
responsibility, which both student and educator must assume. However, the contemporary state of
education, as earlier described, in fact works to abolish the students’ freedom outright, and so with the loss
of freedom it follows that any authentic sense of responsibility for the curriculum, learning, and their unique
potentiality-for-Being is also lost. This occurs because we are telling students in advance what forms of
knowledge are most valuable, what specific “facts” and “skills” are absolutely necessary for mastery, and then
we are handing over to them the curriculum in the form of a pre-packaged finished product. Education of
this type is not intellectually demanding from the perspective of deep meditative rumination, as the
foundation for all critical thought, nor is it personalized in any sense of the term, so it should not be
surprising that students fail to demonstrate an authentic sense of responsibility, they are not beholden to the
material educators are presenting in the curriculum. They are being forced to assume the faux sense
responsibility for things learned that are not of their own choosing or making, things that are not related in
any authentic manner to their own unique fundamental projects. We are doing a great disservice to students by
relieving them of both the burden of freedom and responsibility as related to their unique lives. Because
every single thread forming the student’s web of meanings that comprise her world and potential world,
every action, every for-the-sake-of-which must be done in the service of her unique fundamental project if it is to be
authentic.
In terms that are familiar to educators, the situation described above manifests a lack of student
ownership of to the process of learning, and this I suggest is a problem of monumental proportion. If
students and educators are to ever experience the full weight of their freedom and responsibility, they must
take seriously with what Sartre indicates about those who ignore, or flee-in-the-face of, their responsibility as
autonomous agents: When in “anguish” we shirk the responsibilities of enacting our freedom, we are living
an existence of bad faith, for we must not seek to, nor should we impose this condition on others, relinquish
the burden of responsibility that has been given over to us in light of our being condemned to an existence
that is bound up with autonomous choice and action, When living authentically, we “cannot help escape the
feeling of [our] total and deep responsibility” for our lives and fundamental project (Sartre, 1986, p. 472) It is
clear from the foregoing diagnosis of the crisis in contemporary education, educators must shoulder much, if
not all, of the burden for creating learning institutions that are exemplary of bad faith. There must be a move
by teachers to engender an authentic sense of responsibility, or ownership, in the classroom, which
accompanies the informed choices that our students make in the process of learning. This relates directly to
the manner in which the learning unfolds, i.e., the “how” of an authentic education and the pinnacle role that
the teacher must assume when working towards structuring and managing an authentic classroom in order to
facilitate and allow for a deep and true sense of ownership in student learning to once again emerge, and
hence, revive the all-important sense of responsibility for the unique and authentic choices they make.
Sartre’s concept of nothingness as earlier introduced will prove helpful when envisaging the space of
education as the locus of potential, growth, and evolution. “If man as the existentialist conceives him is
indefinable, it is because at first he is nothing” (Sartre, 1986, p. 471). This notion includes responsibility for
the learning environment that students and educators have formed as well as a responsibility for its future
enactment, by means of speculating on how the learning environment might be improved in more authentic
ways through collective choice. It is crucial to grasp that the present structure of worlds within the classroom
represents what Sartre calls the “given,” that which has been brought into existence through the autonomous
choices we have made, and the Being of both educators and students “causes there to be a given by [first]
breaking with it and illuminating it in the light of the not-yet-existing,” and that which does not yet exist,
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represents our unique futural potential (p. 615). The notion of nothingness also relates to learning, knowledge,
and meaning, i.e., what we already know and what we seek to know in the future as it relates to the
fundamental project of education to which we are contributing. If educators view the context of the classroom
authentically, a sense of nothingness must be acknowledged, they must remain open to student potential, which
is the understanding of those elements of human existence, as Being-for-itself, that have not yet been enacted,
and can never be fully determined in advance of the situation at a remove from the lived world of the
classroom, the locus of the merging of transcendence and facticity. To teach and to learn is to be as “projection”
toward the future, with the knowledge that learning occurs when what is (a current lack of knowledge) is
rejected in the move to bring about a condition that is not as of yet present (future erudition as actualized
potential brought about by our inquiries). Reading Sartre we are reminded that no educational program, no
curriculum, no lesson, no method of pedagogy, no schema for classroom management, despite the amount
of research poured into its justification is determinate, for he is adamant that that no current state of affairs
(including education as a national institution) can influence the projection of our freedom, nor can any
factual state “determine consciousness [Being-for-itself] to apprehend it as a negatite or as a lack” (Ibid. p. 615).
When discussing the importance of the awareness of the values we are choosing in the classroom,
recall that our actions affect the lives of those around us. It is crucial to understand that in choosing our
values in the present moment of action, in the situation, and “creating the man we want to be, there is not a
single one of our acts which does not at the same time create an image of man as we think he ought to be”
(Sartre, 1986, p. 427). Thus, educators assume a double-responsibility when choosing values, for not only do
they establish values in the present, they are simultaneously bound up with projecting these values upon
others, and in an undeniable ethical sense, making a powerful normative declaration that others should
assume the values they are endorsing. Here, I focus exclusively on the educator and the awareness that she is
at all times modeling values for students along with embodying the collective values of the educational
programs that she endorses. For if the context of the classroom represents a communal, ecumenical
fundamental project of learning in macrocosm, the teacher must be vigilant at all times about what her choices
(personal and educational) indicate about the values she is projecting onto students. This includes everything
from the physical structure of the classroom’s environment, the way the room is arranged, the style of
instruction, the manner of assessment, to the tone and timbre of her discipline. In addition, simply the
manner in which she expresses her thoughts and emotions to the students is indicative of her value system.7
While Sartre is clear that our values are really groundless, for without God, the luminous realm of intrinsic
values falls, evaporates, it is perhaps safe to say that an educator choosing and modeling an authentic
existence would demonstrate the characteristics of an engaged, authentic learner, a person who genuinely
functions as a co-facilitator and co-participant in the process of learning, and as such, would be of great
benefit to all students.

C. What Teachers Should Know and Learn About Caring for Their Being and the Being of Students: Knowledge of
Learners in an Authentic Social Community
It is the case that the authentic learner is in integral component of an authentic learning collective, whose
fundamental project might be described in terms of a caring collective who are engaged in the ecumenical
pursuit of their “destiny” as authentic learners. Caring for our own Being of that of others as a “primordial
structural totality, lies before [“vor”] every factical ‘attitude’ and ‘situation’ of Dasein, and it does so
existentially a priori; this means that it is always in them” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 238/193). In order to speak of
a true community of learners in the Heideggerian sense must be understood as representing the authentic
possibility of Dasein, because for Heidegger, when Dasein is readied through Angst and individuated for its
7

It is possible to make the claim, in light of what I have presented earlier in the paper, that since teachers are alienated from the
authentic notion of education (curriculum) in a duplicitous sense, that the values they are modeling might not be freely chosen, and in
fact, forced upon them by the social-political-economic ideological factors governing the institution of education. In short, it is the
system that has stripped teachers of their ontological Being-for-Itself. However, if are to read Sartre correctly, and take his arguments
about bad faith to their logical conclusion, to make such a claim, that one is a mere victim, or unwilling and reluctant participant in the
processes of social construction, would amount to the admittance of living a life of bad faith. It is for this reason that I have focused
on the teacher as one who is in full-ownership of her choices and the subsequent values she brings into existence and models.
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authentic existence, this represents the resolute openness to the understanding that its own Being is authentic
(historical) only when in community with others, and this is referred to as Mitsein (“Being-with”). In
Heidegger’s analysis of the existential-ontological structures in relation to time (temporality), he writes about
Dasein’s authentic communal achievement, or its destiny, which is “fateful Dasein,” or the authentic way in
which the human “exists essentially in being with Others, its historizing is a co-historizing and is
determinative for it as destiny [Geschick]” (Ibid. p. 436 /384). In the classroom we are always already bound
up with others in our ecumenical pursuit of learning, and to grasp the weight of this claim, Heidegger
indicates that this social aspect to our Being is the center of our authentic historicality, and it is inextricably
linked with the notion of solicitous care and temporality. The care of a solicitous nature manifests in the
environment of the classroom, where the student’s freedom is embraced and she is given space for both
personal and communal growth within an environment that strives to assure that her own most potential-forBeing becomes as reality in communion with Others.
Learning in community, learning within an intimate social context, is essential to an authentic
education, and we return to Heidegger who indicates that the bond between the teachers and taught
represents the primordial relationship wherein Dasein is in tune with its own Being in communion with the
Being of the other (soul to soul, as it were, in the Platonic ideal of paideia), which allows learning to be as
authentic learning. Importantly, each student brings to the learning context (as having-been) a vast store of
knowledge and personal experience, which holds the potential to make a valuable futural contribution to the
communal learning. Communal learning, in an atmosphere of solicitous care unfolds through a process of
knowledge construction, where the view to knowledge is primarily one of a procedural nature, especially when
dealing with the humanities, art, music, and the like. There is at once care for the communal archive of
knowledge developing as a collective in the classroom, and care for the student’s individual store of
knowledge, as related to her own unique possibilities of existence, which grow and evolve in community with
others who are also demonstrating a like-minded sense of care. Meaning is constructed within a shared
horizon of learning wherein students’ interpretations are composed of clusters of interpretations, and
individual interpretations develop along with, and indeed because of, those with whom the student
participates with in the process of learning. The communal character of learning, where knowledge emerges
through the arduous but respectful process of accepting rejecting, refining validating and honing various
interpretations that are offered up for debate, nurtures the students’ problem-solving abilities through a
process of self-discovery grounded in communicative discourse, or “conversation”.
Simply put, students are engaged in the community of learning because their Being and the Being of
others is an issue, and we might imagine the classroom embodying what Heidegger (2004) refers to as the
“originary community,” which represents Dasein’s authentic dwelling in the world with others, its authentic
destiny, which manifests as a possibility because of the way Dasein is grounded in the world as Care. There is
a true sense of belonging in such an environment embracing “heritage” and students are beholden to the
learning because the classroom or learning community is, “through each individual bound up in advance to
something that binds and determines each individual by exceeding them,” and what they are bound in
advance to is the common, ecumenical goal of authentic learning as the authentic destining of both students
and educators; authentic learning may be likened to the process of historizing, where what is given as heritage
is taken up in “repetition” by the students and creatively interpreted anew, in relation to their unique and
distinct potentiality-for-Being (p. 74). As related to Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, in addition to
foreknowledge, the student also brings a diverse cultural background to the learning context, which has been
given over to her in advance through her unique heritage, as a member of a family, community, and most
importantly, a person with a distinct, and unalterable, culture ground. This authentic aspect of our Being, as
Being-with, must not be overlooked, and functions as a valuable and indispensable contributory aspect of an
authentic education, which seeks the formation of students in social contexts, welcoming diversity in learning
and actively embracing the social, cultural, and linguistic background of students because these elements are
inherent to their Being-in-the-world with a “heritage”.
Solicitude, according to Heidegger (1968), has two distinct forms, an inauthentic manifestation,
wherein “it can, as it were, take away ‘care’ from the Other and put itself in his position in concern: it can leap
in for him” (p. 158/122). When this form of solicitude manifests in education we have an example of
learning that is devoid of authentic care. Drawing on Heidegger, this taking away of the other’s care might
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manifest in several ways in the classroom: First, in the form of a domineering educator, who assumes that
students are inferior, and secondly, in the form of a dotingly overbearing teacher, one who may be goodhearted and well-intentioned, but is adverse to witnessing students struggling and is all too eager to step in at
the most inopportune moments. Ultimately, she becomes an enabler to students who are dependent on her
for their learning. In both cases, Heidegger indicates that was is actually occurring is that when we are
“dominated” or “dependent,” the notion of solicitous care degenerates into the type of concern we show
objects, and “pertains for the most part to our concern with the ready-to-hand” (p. 158/122). The authentic
manifestation of care is described by Heidegger as
a kind of solicitude that does not so much leap in for the Other as leap ahead of him [ihm vorausspringt] in his
existential potentiality-for-Being, not in order to take away his care but rather to give it back to him
authentically as such for the first time, This kind of solicitude pertains essentially to authentic care – that is, to
the existence of the Other, not to a “what” with which he is concerned; it helps the Other to become
transparent to himself in his care and become free for it (Ibid. p. 159/122).

Dwyer, Prior, & Shargel (1988), writing on Heidegger, authenticity, and education present an accurate
interpretation of how care might manifest in the act of teaching as the solicitous concern for the Being of
students as essential learners. The authors suggest that this latter instance of authentic care is enacted by
teachers who, “rather than doing the work for the students, leaps ahead and prepares the way for them” (p.
147). Students should be given encouragement as they work through formulating their own answers and
solutions to learning quandaries, in a moment of anticipation, as related to fore-knowing as previously
introduced in relation to Paideia, the authentic teacher “should anticipate the obstacles to be encountered
and, rather than remove, help the students to find what is necessary for them to overcome such problems
themselves” (Ibid. p. 147).

4. Concluding Remarks: On the Potential Transformative Value of Phenomenological
Insight for Education
As stated at the outset, I believe that ontological insight into the human and education holds the potential to
enrich professional development and improve the quality of our teaching and teacher education programs.
However, there is resistance to the positive contribution that the type of theorizing represented in this essay
might make to education, and this occurs along two lines: First, practitioners are wary of academics or
curriculum scholars, at a remove from the day-to-day operations of the “lived classroom,” who are writing
on educational issues from the abstract heights of the university, speculating on educational reform by means
of abstruse, impenetrable jargon. Secondly, education policy makers are wary of the potential application of
such philosophical theorizing because it does not live on the epistemological plane of quantitative research
associated with the “bureaucratic rational choice model,” which forms the foundation of what policy makers
prefer to reference. Apple (2004) traces this propensity to resist philosophical methodology in educational
policy making to the overarching anti-theoretical and anti-intellectual tendencies in the United States. For
Apple, resistance is centered around the tradition of “aristocratic culture,” which is underdeveloped in the
United States, and in general, there is disdain for what might be termed “elitism,” which means that
“theoretically complex apparatuses like the kinds of ways of looking at the politics of education and
curriculum that requires a great deal of discipline and study are actually seen as simply ‘mere theory’” of an
impotent, vacuous nature, which is of no practical (or pragmatic) value in the day-to-day happenings of our
schools (p. 185).
Dall ‘Alba (2008) argues along similar lines, stating that such descriptions that take us into the
ontological grounds of the human Being in education are viewed pejoratively as abstruse, metaphysical
speculation, and often “goes unacknowledged in theorizing and practicing relating to higher educational
programs” (p. 42). Clearly, one reason for the “anti-theoretical” attitude toward such philosophizing is the
difficulty in adequately justifying it by means of traditional epistemological models, and like much of
phenomenology it is subjected to the charge of epistemological subjectivism, or worse, relegated to
theoretical scrapheap of obscurantism because it is untenable. However, as Morris (2005) argues, the charge
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of subjectivism and obscurantism leveled at the phenomenology is itself untenable as critique. Admittedly,
there is no way in which to provide categorical objective verification for its claims because they emerge from
descriptions of the lived experiences portrayed. However, this is not to indicate that these descriptions are
limited to subjective ruminations occurring within the interior consciousness of an isolated ego to which
readers have no legitimate epistemic access. Rather, in a manner unique to phenomenology, readers are
“meant to recognize something in this description, a recognition which may be manifested in our spontaneity
of relating” the descriptions contained within the work to our own world and occasions where we have had
similar, if not identical, experiences (p. 29). Morris goes on to add, that far from phenomenological
“descriptions being untestable, we might say that our recognition is a criterion of correctness for a
phenomenological description” (Ibid. p. 29).
In the educational research of Lawrence-Lightfoot & Davis (1994), the “criterion of correctness” of
which Morris writes extends beyond validation through recognition, and serves as testimony to the authenticity
of all that is revealed through the phenomenological lens, which captures “the essence and resonance of the
actors’ experience and perspective through the details of fiction and thought revealed in context” (p. 12).
The authors, in line with the purpose of this essay and the method(s) of epoche and eidetic reduction, writing on
“portraiture” as a methodological tool for conducting qualitative research, which is “framed by the traditions
and values of the phenomenological paradigm,” express identical concerns with revealing and discovering
“resonant universal themes” (pp. 13-14). As was my concern, I sought to highlight the universal themes of
ontology and the invariant structures grounding our existence and the enactment of our authentic modes of
teaching and learning. However, it must be noted that the alternative paradigm for approaching education
that I chose does not represent, despite the fundamental, ontological nature of the discussion, the entire
picture of what authentic education should be. For as Lawrence-Lightfoot & Davis rightly point out,
researchers must always recognize their limitations, and their “inability to capture and present a total reality,”
and thus our purposes must not be “complete and full representation, but rather the selection of some aspect
of – or angle on – reality that would transform our vision of the whole” (Ibid. p. 5).
Thus, I have attempted throughout is to present an aspect of or view to education that is not readily
available to research methods grounded in traditional empirical quantitative methods, in order to reveal, or
tease out, an alternative vision of education as related to the question of the Being, or essence, of authentic
education, which might lead to a transfigured vision of teaching and learning – contributing to a renewed,
invigorated vision of the whole. Although working from the critique of the standardization of education and
professional development, I have refrained from compiling a list of new and improved standards and
practices for teacher training, or specific directives aimed at more efficient professional development, which
are grounded in the above existential-ontological analysis; for to produce yet another rigorously outlined
program of education is counter-productive to the meditative aims of this essay.8 Rather, focused on the
forgotten ontological aspects of learning, I have attempted to speculate on ways in which teacher education
might inspire a move beyond the inauthentic constraints and limitations of the standards imposed on both
teacher education programs and the public schools’ curriculum.
My goal has been to challenge, by presenting an alternative perspective to, the professionalization agenda
in teacher education and the bureaucratic policies endorsing “high stakes testing” in our schools. Teachers
need to approach education in terms of a multi-faceted endeavor, which includes the crucial concern with
the question concerning the existential-ontological grounds of our existence. If we allow our experience of
education as described herein to manifest in terms of the unfolding of the authentic Being of teachers and
learners in community, if educators resonate with the ontological descriptions of education inspired by the
philosophies of Sartre and Heidegger, teachers and students alike might feel empowered to transcend the
8

Darling-Hammond & Bransford (2005) deal with indispensable issues concerning learning and instruction, e.g., what should be
taught, why it is important, how this knowledge should be organized, who learns, how, and why, what kinds of classroom, school,
and school-community environments enhance learning (p. 41). It would be irresponsible and do great harm to our students to remain
skeptical of the effectiveness of such research, or, like those endorsing the professionalization agenda in teacher training, to simply
dismiss out of hand the direct and positive effect that such learning-teaching strategies for educators are having in many classrooms.
It was not my purpose to critique specifically the various strategies offered by those working in teacher development, but rather to
suggest, through philosophical analysis, an alternative way in which to perhaps better and more thoroughly understand the
complexities of teaching and learning.
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alienated state of education within which they find themselves. Much like a work of art, this essay sought to
inspire in the reader a “transformative experience,” functioning in such a way that the “ability to think and
see might generally be altered” (Lawrence-Lightfoot & Davis, 2004, pp. 35). This would allow us to raise the
“reflective glass,” or clarifying lens of our lived, existential experiences of education, in order that we might
freely choose to choose our world, and ourselves and authentically “shape our lives, pedagogy, and institutions” (Ibid.
p. 36).
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